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Abstract
Portugal was hit hard by the globalﬁnancial crisis, with concomitant effects upon the development of
its renewable energy sector. The imposition of austerity has had negative impacts upon the further
development of the Portuguese renewables sector, prompting the question of whether we have seen a
critical juncture that will lead to a newpolicy trajectory. Historical institutionalist analysis
demonstrates a range of unintended consequences arising from the pursuit of austerity in Portugal, yet
no true critical juncture to the country’s commitment to renewable electricity. The path dependent
structure of the Portuguese electricitymarket and the export bottleneck between the Iberian Peninsula
andCentral Europe are identiﬁed as critical variables explaining the sub-optimal policy trajectory.We
conclude that resolving this bottleneckwill be critical for Portugal to reduce currentﬁnancial and
electricity price pressures, and continue its renewable energy transition.
1. Introduction
The EU’s 2009Renewable EnergyDirective seeks to raise the share of renewable energy in the EU’s ﬁnal energy
consumption to 20%by 2020 (EuropeanCommission 2010). Portugal set its own 2020 target at 31%, aiming to
achieve 60%of its electricity generation from renewable energy sources (RES). However, at the same time as
Portugal’s targets were approved by the EuropeanCommission (EC), the country came under increasing
scrutiny by the EU and the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) for its high government deﬁcit and increasing
debt levels. As Portugal’sﬁnancial situationworsened, the country requested a bailout from the ‘Troika’ of the
EC, EuropeanCentral Bank (ECB), and IMF inApril 2011. The Troika, in turn, demanded signiﬁcant structural
reforms and the introduction of austeritymeasures to consolidate government ﬁnances. Part of these
consolidationmeasures was the obligation to eradicate the country’s growing Feed-in tariff (FiT) debt, and in
2012, the Portuguese government introduced amoratoriumon onshore wind-power and small-hydro FiTswith
no new licenses being issued. Although the licensingmoratoriumwas lifted in 2013, newprojects have not been
entitled for government support, with capacity additions having slowed signiﬁcantly: while average growth rates
for wind additions between 2005 and 2011 stood at 37%, between 2012 and 2018 this rate had dropped to amere
3% (Direção-Geral de Energia eGeologia 2019).Withwind powermaking up over 41%of renewable capacity in
2011, theﬁnancial crisis therefore appears to have had a drastic impact on both Portugal’s debt-practices and the
country’s renewable energy transition (RET), which seems to have become a victim of austerity.
Austerity and rising electricity costs played a crucial role in shifting policy instruments that created
uncertainty and high volatility onRETs inmany countries, including Bulgaria (Andreas et al 2018), Germany
(Andreas 2019), Italy (Grimaccia andRondinella 2015), theUK (Andreas 2019) and Spain (López 2015). These
measures generally led to a decline in capacity growth rates from renewables, and even a complete halt for some
technologies in the case of Bulgaria, while both Spain and Italywere reprimanded by the EuropeanCommission
for failing to transposeDirective 2009/28/ECon renewable energy to achieve the 2020 targets (López 2015). In
Germany, exempting certain consumers from rising electricity costs increased the cost for paying consumers
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even further, adding to the decision to abolish theGerman feed-in tariff system (Andreas 2019). In theUK,
austerity planswere crucial in the axing of the country’s CCS support, and encouraged the shift from the
renewables obligation scheme to a contract for difference system (ibid.).
Drawing onHistorical Institutionalism (HI), we seek to identify whether Portugal’sﬁnancial crisis and the
entry of the Troika represented a critical juncture for the country’s renewable electricity sector.We contribute to
the vast literature onHI by critically evaluating the applicability of a critical juncture to real-world policy-change
in a case inwhich two separate institutions interact: those ofﬁscal sustainability and sustainable energy. This
paper investigatesHI in the relatively novel context of renewable energy transitions (Stefes 2010), for whichHI’s
potential and limitations has only recently been established (Lockwood et al 2017). Thematically, the Portuguese
REThas received signiﬁcant attention from academics in the past (Herman 2013, Gouveia et al 2014, Pereira and
Rodrigues 2015,Delicado et al 2016, Stefanini 2016, Peña et al 2017), andwhile there is a growing number of
analyses on the effects of the economic crisis and austerity onRETs in Europe (Skovgaard 2014, Slominski 2016,
Andreas et al 2017, 2018, Burns et al 2019), the implications of austerity on the Portuguese REThas not yet been
investigated. As Europe is about to enter its next periods of climate targets for 2030 and beyond, we provide a
timely analysis of these implications. Our empirical analysis draws on secondary literature, including policy
papers, reports, and assessments, and is supported by semi-structured elite interviews.
In section 2, we establish our analytical framework, focusing onHI’s concepts of path-dependence,
unintended consequences, sub-optimal policy developments, and critical junctures. In our analysis in section 3,
we,ﬁrstly, establish Portugal’s sustainable energy institution, and, secondly, brieﬂy address Portugal’s plunge
into ﬁnancial crisis in order to identify the consequences of the entry of the Troika for Portugal’s renewable
policy. Our results indicate that there has not been a critical juncture for Portugal’s renewable sector, but that the
current slump in renewable growth is an unintended consequence of the renewable policy adjustments that seek
tomeet theﬁscal requirements imposed by the Troika. In section 4, we consequently discuss the sub-optimal
structure of the Portuguese renewablesmarket that played a critical role both in the initial emergence of the tariff
debt, and in the unintended consequences of the current renewables policy. In our recommendations and
conclusions, we stress that overcoming these structural issues will be crucial for the economic viability of
Portugal’s RET and hence can also play an important role in improving the country’s wider ﬁscal situation.
2. Analytical framework
Weemploy historical institutionalism (HI) as an analytical, comparative approach that allows the identiﬁcation
of change in institutional structures across time.We conducted a literature review and analysis of Portugal’s
renewable energy policy since 1988. In order to establish a comprehensive narrative we also conducted six in-
depth semi-structured elite interviews withmembers of both governmental (EuropeanCommission; European
Parliament), and non-governmental institutions (WWFPortugal; Portuguese Association for Renewable
Energy, APREN; and the EuropeanWind Energy Association, EWEA, nowWindEurope). The analytical process
was one of triangulation, both guiding and reafﬁrming the policy analysis.
HI revolves around institutions, or paradigms (Peters et al 2005), that are the recurring patterns of behaviour
representing the structures andmechanisms of social orderwithin a given context (Capoccia 2015). In a political
context they refer to public policies and political regimes (Capoccia andKelemen 2007, Stefes 2010). HI provides
‘generalisable explanations of patterns of diversity and change’within these institutions (Lockwood et al 2017,
p. 315).
Our analysis focuses on two institutions. First, the institution ofﬁscal sustainability that emergedwith the
rise of neo-liberalism in the 1970s, which views excessive debt as undermining economic andﬁnancial stability.
Debt should therefore bemaintained at sustainable (i.e.minimal) levels (Checherita andRother 2010),
promoting governmentalmonetary restraint and budgetary austerity. Both are deeply embedded in the EU’s
Stability andGrowth Pact (EuropeanCommission 2015a). Second, the sustainable energy institution represents
the growing global policy trend of breaking theworld’s dependence on fossil fuels by promoting the share of
clean and renewable energy sources to combat growing biodiversity losses andmitigate climate change
(Cardinale et al 2012).
The inherent self-reinforcing processes of institutions render themhighly rigid in nature as the speciﬁc
principles and assumptions that institutions represent commonly constrain the availability of options of choice
(Pierson 2000a, p. 492). As such, institutions become entrenched on a certain track that is not easily reversed or
altered, known as ‘path dependence’ (Stefes 2010). Institutional structuresmay suffer from sub-optimal policy
developments, inwhich, due to the stickiness of institutions, less or ineffective policies are protected or
reinforced. This trend is further aggravated by actors’ lacking foresight and unintended institutional effects
(Pierson 2000b). As such, ‘long-term institutional consequencesmay be the by-products of actions taken for
short-termpolitical reasons’ (ibid., p.479) that can often be observed in democratic systems. An increased
2
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acknowledgement of long-term issues can be achieved bymaking governments accountable to actors with
longer time horizons, for example international organisations (Pierson 2000b, p. 480).
A ‘rare event in the development of an institution’ (Capoccia andKelemen 2007, p. 368) is the critical
juncture inwhich a signiﬁcant, commonly exogenous, shock facilitates a short period of social and political
ﬂuidity, duringwhich the ability of an institution to self-replicate is undermined, allowing for political agency to
shape the outcome (Collier andCollier 1993, Pierson 2000b, Capoccia andKelemen 2007, Stefes 2010,
Capoccia 2015). The notion of a short period of time stands relative to the duration of the path-dependent
phases of the institutional structures preceding and following the juncture. Social and political ﬂuidity
(contingency) represents a crucial factor of critical junctures, as it breaks the constraints of the path-dependence
phase. The choicesmade during a juncturemay trigger a newpath-dependent process, thereby constraining
future choices. As the direction of this process rests with the decisionsmade by inﬂuential agents, their role is
critical.
Critical junctures are commonly associatedwith, and deﬁned as, ‘a period of signiﬁcant change’ (Collier and
Collier 1993, p. 29). However, Capoccia andKelemen (2007) argue that a critical juncturemay also involve the
‘restoration of the pre-critical juncture status quo’ or a ‘re-equilibriumof an institution’ (p.352). Yet, the
traditional critical juncture literature stresses the importance of signiﬁcant, or paradigmatic, change as part of a
critical juncture (Hall andTaylor 1996, p. 10, Peters et al 2005, p. 1286, David 2007, p. 3, Lockwood et al 2017, p.
323). Also considering the danger of blurring the qualitative lines towards amere policy window
(Kingdon 1984), wemaintain that signiﬁcant change represents an essential factor of a critical juncture. In doing
so, we face the challenge of distinguishing between ‘signiﬁcant’ and ‘ordinary’ change, as the latter is also
common in path-dependent periods (Peters et al 2005).
Our policy review, interviews and in-depth analysis seek to overcome this qualitative vagueness by focusing
on four institutional structures (economic, cultural, ideological, organisational) (Capoccia andKelemen 2007,
Stefes 2010). To empirically determine the existence of a critical juncture based on the above deﬁnition, the
following three aspects need to bemet:
(i) Time: short time period relative to the path-dependent period(s).
(ii) Contingency: the existence of structural ﬂuctuations that provide a ‘broader than typical range of feasible
options’ (Capoccia andKelemen 2007, p. 348).
(iii) Change: paradigmatic change affecting the institutional structures (economic, cultural, ideological, and
organisational).
3. Portugal’s Renewable Energy Transition and the Financial Crisis
The analysis of the time factor takes into account that a critical juncture does not necessarily have to be a discrete
event but can be an accumulation of related events (Capoccia andKelemen 2007, p. 350). In the Portuguese case,
related events beginwith Portugal’sﬁnancial crisis in 2010, followed by the country’s bailout and endedwith the
exit of the three-year EU/IMFﬁnancial assistance program inMay 2014. Since then, Portugal has been under ex
post evaluation, a tool of the EuropeanCommission to assess the effectiveness of a speciﬁc intervention
(EuropeanCommission 2016a, p. 9). Althoughwe cannot yet establish a post-juncture path dependent period of
signiﬁcant duration, we consider the period of a potential critical juncture to beginwith Portugal’sﬁnancial
crisis in 2010, and endwith the exit of the Troika in 2014.
3.1. Renewable energy trajectory, 1988–2010
Portugal’sﬁrst support scheme for renewables was established through theDecree Law 189/88 that installed an
undifferentiated FiT system to all renewables. In 1995, Portugal’s electricitymarket was converted from a
vertically integrated statemonopoly into a dualmarket structure, comprised of a Public Service System (SEP)
and a liberalised system (LM) (Amorim et al 2013). Crucially, in 2001, in response to ECDirective 2001/77/CE,
the Portuguese government initiated the E4 Programme (Energy Efﬁciency and Endogenous Energies) that
established 2010 targets of 39%of electricity from renewables and an overall installed renewable capacity of
8.8 GW (including hydropower) (Peña et al 2017).
In 2001, the Portuguese and Spanish governmentsmade plans to integrate the two countries’ electricity
market into a single Iberian ElectricityMarket (MIBEL). After furthermarket restructuring following the 2003
Resolution of theCouncil ofMinistries (RCM 63/2003) and the 2005National Energy Strategy,MIBELwas
launched in July 2007 and the Portuguese electricitymarket liberalisation completed to the degree that all
electricity customers were freely able to choose and change their electricity provider (Del Río et al 2016).
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In 2007, the purchase obligation for energy under the special regime (renewables and cogeneration)was
extended to the last-resort supplier, leaving RES generators effectively outside thewholesalemarket (Amorim
et al 2013). Between 2006 and 2008, Portugal ran a three phasemulti-criteria auction for a total of 1.8 GW,where
lowest possible development costs only weighted 20% to theﬁnal tender decision, while 45%of the bid decision
wasmade to ensure high direct and indirect investment volumes, as well as a high job creation and gross added
value around the development of renewables (Del Río et al 2016). In 2007 the target for consumption of energy
produced fromRESwas increased to 45%by 2010.
The government renewable policies of the early 2000swere highly successful in achieving renewable targets.
Between 2004 and 2009more than 500MWofwind powerwere installed yearly. By 2010, Portugal achieved
almost 9.7 GWof renewable capacity, 4.23 GWofwhichwas in large-scale hydro, and over 3.9 GWwind (IEA
Wind 2013). Electricity fromnon-hydropower renewables reached a share of 24.4% in total generation, second
in theworld only toDenmark, plus a 30.8% share of hydropower—signiﬁcantly overachieving its targets for
2010 (IEA 2016).
3.2. Theﬁscal institution and theﬁnancial crisis
The EMU’s convergence criteria establishmaximum levels of government deﬁcit (3%ofGDP) and debt (60%of
GDP). Pereira andWemans (2012) stress that a government deﬁcit has been considered ‘normal in Portuguese
political discourse’ (p.3), with deﬁcits being ‘the rule without exception’ (ibid.). Since its emergence from
authoritarian rule in 1974, Portugal never achieved a surplus in its state budget with onlyGreece having a
similarly poor record (Eurostat 2017,World Bank 2017). The country therefore repeatedly introduced austerity
programmes; in 1977, 1983 (Courakis et al 1993), 1991 (VonHagen and Strauch 2001), and again in 2000
(Blanchard 2007, Cunha andBraz 2007). However, ‘crucial reforms [K] in the public administration,
instrumental to curb the growth of compensation of employees, and the private sector social security system
were barely initiated’ (ibid., p.115).
In the run up to the 2008ﬁnancial crisis, the Portuguese government ‘did not adapt [its]ﬁscal policy to the
new slow-growth environment’ (Eichenbaum et al 2016, p. 10). To boost economic growth and prevent a deeper
recession, the EU-wide European Economic Recovery Plan established aﬁscal stimulus of 400 billion EURby
March 2009 (Council of the EuropeanUnion 2009). Portugal’s stimulus increased the government deﬁcit to
9.8% in 2009 and 11.2% in 2010 (Eurostat 2017). Primary causes for this rise were a reducedVAT tax rate in
2009 andwage raises for civil servants in anticipation of parliamentary elections that year, as well as the country’s
Investment and Employment Initiative that, althoughmeant to be temporary, continued into 2010 (Pereira and
Wemans 2012).
As the sovereign debt crisis unfolded through the bailouts of Greece and Ireland inMay andNovember 2010,
Portugal’s high public and external debt, pairedwith slowing growth prospects, led to downward revisions of the
country’s sovereign credit rating (Almeida et al 2014). Higher risk premiums charged for borrowing triggered
increased costs to service public debt that risked Portugal defaulting,making a bail-out inevitable byApril 2011
(Pereira andWemans 2012).
3.3. TheTroika and the tariff debt
Thememorandumof understanding (MoU) signed in 2011with the Troika addressed ﬁve areas for required
reform and adjustments, one of which (iv) required furthermeasures for the liberalisation of the electricity
market and an end to the rising tariff debt. The tariff debt accumulated from2007 onwards due to a
misalignment between regulated tariffs that are based on one-year-ahead estimates on fuel costs and actual
market prices, and the so-called policy costs, the production costs originated by government decisions (Linden
et al 2014, EuropeanCommission 2016a). Essentially, ‘the energy tariff was not enough to cover the costs of
buying energy; and politically there’s a decision [to bemade] to put the burden on consumers or just to
accumulate [it as debt].’5Between 2006 and 2011 this rising debt was not repaid and reached 1.7 billion EURby
2011 (EuropeanCommission 2016b). As amember ofDGECFIN summarised:
‘the[Portuguese] energy sector is amirror of what happened in thewhole economy; over-indebt-
edness and not thinking in a sustainable way to repay this debt; and that’s when the Troika kicked
in saying, this is going too far, you cannot afford this, youwill have to shrink it somehow. The
tariff debtwewitnessed in Portugal is widely relatedwith political choices that weremade but
were not budgeted.’6
5
EU-P01-ECFIN.
6
EU-P02-ECFIN.
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The government introduced several subsequent energy policy packages. In 2012, amoratoriumonwind, co-
generation and small-hydro FiTswas implemented, with no new licenses being issued.Unlike in Spain, the
moratoriumonly affected newprojects and did not change contracts retroactively after an agreement was
reachedwith producers who agreed to pay a levy until 2020. The authorities ‘formally recognized the right of the
affected utilities to recover the corresponding amount’ (Linden et al 2014, p. 23), and regulated tariffs for
householdswere gradually abolished between 2013 and 2015 (ibid., p.30).
Since 2013, onshore wind, co-generation and small-hydro power projects can again be developed, however
without any governmental support. Yet, no newmajor projects in these technologies had been contracted for
several years.7 In the same year, the government repealed and revised itsNREAP, taking into account the falling
energy consumption levels as a consequence of the economic crisis and efﬁciency improvements, and the
adjusted support instruments. It reduced thewind capacity target to 5.3 GW (EuropeanUnion 2015, European
Commission 2016c), whichwas reached almost entirely through already awarded projects, with onlyminor
additions through repowering and retroﬁtting of existing assets in 2016 (Direção-Geral de Energia e
Geologia 2019).8
Further policy packagesmodiﬁed remuneration regimes for cogeneration projects and reduced
compensation for the early termination of former long-termpower purchase agreements (European
Commission 2014, p. 63). A special levy on the energy sector (Exceptional Contribution of the Energy Sector),
excluding RES and small operators, was also established. Initially set to run only in 2014, the levywas extended to
2015 and 2016 (ibid.). Frequent policy changes increased uncertainty for investors and developers during those
years.9As a consequence, even reaching the lowered 2020 targets has been called into question. As APREN
stated: ‘we are at 52%now, to reach 60% is quite difﬁcult because the new [renewables]projects are quite few
and projects that start nowneed two to three years toﬁnish, so there is not enough time’.10
3.4. JunctureOrNo Juncture?
Theﬁnancial and economic crisis led to strong global advocacy to create new economic and ﬁnancial structures,
improving the system’s sustainability (Edenhofer and Stern 2009, Read 2009, Reinhart andRogoff 2009,
UNEP 2009, Everett et al 2010, Leichenko et al 2010, Tienhaara 2010, Bina and LaCamera 2011, Bina 2013,
Foxon 2013). However, contingencywas expressed differently in the Portuguese case. Rather than extending the
available options of choice for Portugal, the ﬁnancial crisis forced the government to request a bailout package,
empowering the Troika that found itself with an availability of choices in how to address Portugal’s growing debt
problem.
The requirements imposed by the Troika dictated reforms (liberalisation) and a certain policy path
(austerity). However, while these actions restricted Portugal’s policy options, it enforced aﬁscal approach that
was different to that implemented by domestic actors. Thereby, the Troika actually provided a newpolicy that
was unlikely to have been pursuedwithout external pressure. However, this increased power of the Troika only
addressed issues ofﬁscal imbalance. The policy decisionsmade after 2011 sought to halt the further
accumulation of tariff debt, and through the generation of additional revenues begin reducing it.11
Portugal continued its FiT scheme formicro renewable electricity generators although at lower rates. In
2011, a newmini generation programmewas added to the existingmicro one from2010 (International Energy
Agency 2017).Decree-LawNo.153/2014 further established the legal regimes applicable to the production of
electricity for self-consumption fromRES. Thesemeasures particularly beneﬁted rooftop solar installations in
residential and commercial settings. Although the introduced special levy aimed to reduce the budget deﬁcit, it
explicitly excludedRES and small-scale plants (EnergiasDe Portugal (2013), EUBusiness 2016).
In 2015, Portugal published its ‘GreenGrowth Commitment 2030’ that established new, ambitious renewable
targets of 40% inﬁnal energy consumption that imply an increase to about 80% in the share of renewables in the
country’s electricity generation. This target has since been raised to 47%by 2030 and is supported by an almost 5
bn EUR renewable energy investment budget, aimed to increase wind capacity to over 9 GW (European
Commission 2018). Culturally and ideologically these policies represent a continuing positive attitude and
commitment to renewables, which have had an overall positive economic effect. The Portuguese wind industry
alone supported an estimated 3,200 jobs and generated an income of 1,170mnEUR in 2013, and simultaneously
allowed the saving of about 4.3 mn tons of CO2 emissions (IEAWind 2013). This CO2 level reduction also
reduced the number of permits required from the EU’s Emission Trading Scheme. According toAPREN, the
joint beneﬁts of renewables onmarket prices, reduced fossil fuel imports, savedCO2 emissions and permit costs
7
EU-P01-ECFIN/PT-P01-APREN.
8
PT-P01/2-APREN.
9
PT-P02-APREN.
10
PT-01-APREN.
11
EU-P01-ECFIN.
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are ‘twice or three times bigger than the [costs of] feed-in tariffs.’12The sector’s generally positive role for the
Portuguese economy is a fact APRENGeneral Secretary JoséManuelMedeiros Pinto says ‘everyone here in
Portuguese society understands’.13 Indeed, just after the exit of the Troika, Portugal still reached the second
highest number of respondents (94%) across the EUﬁnding that nationally set renewable targets for 2030 are
important, and the highest number of respondents (84%) agreeing that a reduction of fossil fuel imports will
beneﬁt the EU (EuropeanCommission 2015b).
Asﬁgure 1 shows, renewable electricity and particularly wind capacity increased dramatically towards the
2010 targets.With the entry of the Troika and the subsequentmoratorium for large scale hydropower andwind
until 2013, capacity expansion can be seen to largely plateau for these technologies in the immediate aftermath of
the crisis, followed again by an uptick in growth rates around 2015/16 at least for hydrogen. At the same time,
continued support for solar power pairedwith cost improvementsmeant solar PV grew steadily despite the
crisis. These dynamics of renewable capacity growth depict how the outlined policy decisions represent a
ﬁnancially-induced policy adjustment, albeit within themaintained, enewable path. Indeed, the importance to
continue the expansion of renewablesmeant that from a ﬁnancial standpoint the introducedmeasures were still
considered largely insufﬁcient:
‘the government did not take sufﬁcient ownership andmissed the opportunity to reformmore
decisively this key sector. [K]Eliminating the tariff debt, which is heavily weighing on the high
costs of electricity for end users, remains a signiﬁcant challenge if price increases are to be kept
limited as desirable forﬁrms’ competitiveness and households’ budgets.’ (European
Commission 2016a, p. 83)
The EC stressed that the government’s resistance tomore decisive policy reformswas based in part on the
aim to develop green energy, showing that Portugal did notwant to undermine its support (ibid.). By 2015 the
tariff debt had reached about 5 billion EUR and in 2016, theCommission raised doubts over its elimination by
2020 (EuropeanCommission 2016a).
Theﬁndings depict the complex interplay across the ﬁscal sustainability and sustainable energy institutions,
and the various levels of agency. Considering the contingency factor, Portugal’sﬁnancial crisis necessitated a
bailout, which in turn obligated the Portuguese government to address itsﬁscal unsustainability. Considering
the number of unsuccessful attempts of the past and the resistance austerity experienced in Portugal over the
past years, it is safe to assume that without the entry of the Troika, no rigorous austeritymeasures would have
Figure 1.Timeline of Portuguese Installed Renewable Capacity, inMW, and key policy events, 2001–2018 (Direção-Geral de Energia e
Geologia 2019).
12
PT-P02-APREN.
13
PT-P02-APREN.
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been implemented (Príncipe 2013). Theﬁnancial crisis, therefore, provided the institutionalﬂuidity that
empowered the Troika to impose a policy change by largely restricting Portugal’s choice of options. This
development hints at a critical juncture in Portugal’sﬁscal sustainability institution.
It is, however, difﬁcult to claim that theﬁnancial crisis has been a critical juncture for the Portuguese
renewables sector. Despite its policy consequences, there has been no fundamental political, cultural or
ideological change. Indeed, the government and the public remain committed to expanding renewable energy,
which led to its resurgence towards 2020 and new 2030 targets. The structural reforms of the renewable sector
were focused solely on the elimination of the existing tariff debt. As Carlos Zorrinho, former Secretary of State
for Energy and Innovation (2009–2011) and nowmember of the European Parliament, stated:
‘[The]Troika has aﬁnancial approach and not an economic or scientiﬁc approach. They don’t
look how to change the economicmodel to try to bemore competitive. They look to the budget
and say how to cut it. The Troika is not for or against renewables; the Troika is for less incentives
andmore cuts’.14
The cancellation of FiT support sought to halt the accumulation of further tariff debtwithout preventing the
development ofmature renewable technologies. Nevertheless, this decision severely limited the capacity
additions particularly fromnewwind projects due to a lack of commerciality. This implication should be
considered an unintended consequence of the debt-focused policy reform. In the following sectionwe discuss
the fundamental structural issue of Portugal’s RET that affected this development.
4. The grid challenge: the future of Portugal’s renewables
As the EuropeanCommission’s (2013) guidance for the design of renewable support schemes states: ‘themarket
does not provide the optimal level of renewables in the absence of public intervention [K] due tomarket and
regulatory failures’ (p.3). For Portugal a key issue that disincentivised newwind projects after 2013 is the export
bottleneck between the Iberian Peninsula andCentral Europe.
Due to its intermittency, Portugal’s wind power share of total demand has been recorded to vary between 0%
to over 91% (between 2007 and 2014) (Pereira andRodrigues 2015). Sincewind power has dispatch priority, it
causes signiﬁcant variability in the supply curve (Pereira andRodrigues 2015). Hence, althoughwind energy can
decrease averagewholesale electricity price levels, it also increases price volatility (ibid.). This instability was
exacerbated by falling demand levels during the crisis that led to periodic oversupplies of electricity across
MIBEL.15 Jointly, in 2013, Spain and Portugal produced 335,238 GWhof electricity and consumed just
277,266 GWh, about 82.7%of total electricity produced (IEA 2015). Crucially, this oversupply could not be
balanced through the export of electricity, increasing cost for generators and consumers.
For decades the EUhas sought to create a single European electricitymarket, with the Juncker Commission’s
EnergyUnion strategy seeking to achieve an internal energymarket with aligned prices (European
Commission 2017). However, while the creation ofMIBEL rendered electricity exchangewithin the Iberian
Peninsula a non-issue, due to its geographic position exporting excess electricity is extremely difﬁcult.16 In
February 2015 a new interconnector between France and Spain, the ﬁrst built in almost 30 years, was
inaugurated to double the existing commercial exchange capacity to 2.8 GW (Crampes and von der Fehr
(2018)). Until 2015, only four high voltage interconnectors existedwith a greater capacity (1.4 GW) fromFrance
to Spain, than fromSpain to France (1.1 GW) (Carvalho Figueiredo andPereira da Silva (2015)). In contrast,
Germany had an available interconnection capacity of 21.3 GW in 2012 (Bayer 2015). As such, ‘MIBEL can be
seen as an almost isolated system’ (Pereira et al 2018, pp. 2–3).
In summary, times of oversupply and lack of export possibilities due to the isolation of the Iberian electricity
market acted to amplify unfavourablemarket conditions.Without an adequate connection to the European
market, both Portugal and Spainwill continue to struggle to promote a cost-effective RET. As amember ofDG
Energy stated: ‘without a development of interconnections you cannot beneﬁt from the full potential of
renewable energy in Portugal and Spain. So, the question of interconnections is instrumental to the
development of the sector. If youwant to get closer tomarket values, you need to be able to export’.17
14
EU-P04-PARL.
15
PT-P03-APREN.
16
EU-P04-PARL.
17
EU-P03-ENER.
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5. Conclusions and policy recommendations
Based on the three deﬁning aspects of time, contingency, and change our analysis did not identify a critical
juncture for Portugal’s renewable energy transition.Having determined the Portuguese ﬁnancial crisis as the
potential juncture period from2010 to 2014, we established the Portuguese renewable energy path until 2010.
Although our analysis revealed that the Troika’s enforcement of austerity represented a potentially signiﬁcant
change to Portugal’sﬁscal institution, we could not identify a subsequent paradigm shift in the country’s
renewable path.While policy adjustments effectively prevented new onshorewind frombeing contracted, other
measures and the introduction of 2030 targets signalled the continuing support for renewables. Indeed, we
consider the negative implications of the above policy changes to be unintended consequences that stem from
the sub-optimal structure of the Portuguese electricitymarket, primarily due to the export bottleneck between
the Iberian Peninsula andCentral Europe. The subdued domestic demand during the economic crisis, paired
with the lack of export opportunities has undermined the expansion of renewable electricity generation and led
to increased electricity prices for consumers.
To overcome Portugal’sﬁnancial issues, as well as improve the economic viability of its renewable sector
means to provide improved interconnection between the Iberian Peninsula and the rest of Europe that would
further allow an improved balancing of RES across the European electricitymarkets.
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Appendix 1. Semi-structuredQuestionnaire from Interviews
B.1. Indicative questions on renewable energy transitions in Portugal during the economic and European
Debt crises
Whatwould you consider the key drivers of Portugal’s renewable energy transition?
In your view, have there been changes in the scope, ambition, or pace of Portugal’s renewable energy
transitions over recent years?
If yes, what have been the causes, andwhat are its effects?
Have the economic crisis and the EuropeanDebt Crisis affected Portugal’s renewable energy transition?
If yes, inwhatways has this been visible?
Has there been a change in the government’s support for renewable energy?
If so, what was the rationale for such changes?
Has there been a shift in the type or extent of renewable policy instruments?
Has the volume of new renewable projects changed?
Have budget cuts affected the implementation or operation of renewable programs?
What role have energy costs played?
Has there been a signiﬁcant change in investment levels in the renewable sector over the course of
the crisis?
If not, why do you think this is?
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Annex 2. List of Interviewees
Organisation Position Area Code
WWFPortugal Advisor/Expert Non-Proﬁt Organisation PT-PO3-WWF
DGECFIN Economic Analyst EuropeanCommission/
Government
EU-PO1-ECFIN
DGECFIN Economic Analyst EuropeanCommission/
Government
EU-PO2-ECFIN
DGENER Analyst EuropeanCommission/
Government
EU-PO3-ENER
European Parliament MEP, former State Secretary
Energy
European Parliament/Government EU-PO4-PARL
EuropeanWind EnergyAssociation (EWEA) Analyst Industry EU-PO5-EWEA
Portuguese Renewables Association
(APREN)
Engineer Industry PT-PO1-
APREN
Portuguese Renewables Association
(APREN)
General Secretary Industry PT-PO2-
APREN
ORCID iDs
Jan-Justus Andreas https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1992-9947
References
AlmeidaH,Cunha I, FerreiraMA andRestrepo F 2014The real effects of sovereign credit rating downgradesThe Journal of Finance 72 1–16
AmorimF,Vasconcelos J, Abreu I C, Silva P P andMartins V 2013Howmuch room for a competitive electricity generationmarket in
Portugal?Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev. 18 103–18
Andreas J-J, BurnsC andTouza J 2017Renewable energy as a luxury? A qualitative comparative analysis of the role of the economy in the
EU’s renewable energy transitions during the ‘Double Crisis’Ecol. Econ. 142 81–90
Andreas J J, BurnsC andTouza J 2018Overcoming energy injustice? Bulgaria’s renewable energy transition in times of crisisEnergy Research
and Social Science 42 44–52
Andreas J J 2019Turning Cuts intoGrowth: German andBritish Renewable Energy andClimate Policy During the Economic Crisis edCBurns
et alThe impact of the economic crisis on european environmental policy (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press)
Bayer E 2015Report on the German power system, Agora Energiewende
BinaO2013The green economy and sustainable development: an uneasy balance?Environment and Planning C:Government and Policy 31
1023–47
BinaO and LaCamera F 2011 Promise and shortcomings of a green turn in recent policy responses to the ‘Double crisis’Ecol. Econ. 70
2308–16
BlanchardO 2007Adjustment within the euro. The difﬁcult case of Portugal Portuguese Economic Journal 6 1–21
BurnsC, Tobin P and Sewerin S 2019The Impact of the Economic Crisis on European Environmental Policy (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press)
CapocciaG 2015Critical Junctures and institutional changeAdvances in ComparativeHistorical Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversity Press) 147–80Advances inComparativeHistorical Analysis in the Social Sciences
CapocciaG andKelemenRD2007The study of critical junctures: theory, narrative, and counterfactuals in historical institutionalismWorld
Politics 59 341–69
Cardinale B J et al 2012Corrigendum: biodiversity loss and its impact on humanityNature 489 326–326
Carvalho FigueiredoN and Pereira da Silva P 2015Explanatory Variable on South-West Spot ElectricityMarkets Integration ed PGodinho and
JDias (Imprensa daUniversidade de Coimbra: AssessmentMethodologies: Energy,Mobility andOther RealWorldApplication)
(https://doi.org/10.14195/978-989-26-1039-9)
Checherita C andRother P 2010The impact of high and growing government debt on economic growthAnEmpirical Investigation for the
Euro Area,Working paper Series of the European Central Bank (https://doi.org/10.2307/2281644)
Collier R B andCollierD 1993 Shaping the political arena: critical junctures, the labormovement, and regime dynamics in Latin America
(Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press)Contemporary Sociology (https://doi.org/10.2307/2075739)
Council of the EuropeanUnion 2009 Presidency conclusions. URL https://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/
ec/110889.pdf (accessed 7.8.19)
Courakis A S,Moura-Roque F andTridimasG 1993 Public expenditure growth inGreece and Portugal:Wagner’s law and beyondApplied
Economics 25 125–34
CrampesC and von der FehrN 2018DecentralisedCross-Border InterconnectionCREEWorking Paper Series 11 1–22
Cunha J C andBrazCR 2007 Public Expenditure and Fiscal Consolidation in PortugalOECD Journal on Budgeting 6 103–21
David PA 2007 Path dependence: a foundational concept for historical social scienceCliometrica. 1 91–114
Del Río P et al 2016Auctions for Renewable Energy Support inGermany: Instruments and Lessons Learnt. AURES 1–25. URLhttps://
researchgate.net/publication/333719325_Auctions_for_Renewable_Energy_Support_Lessons_Learned_in_the_AURES_Project
(accessed 7.8.19)
9
Environ. Res. Commun. 1 (2019) 091005
DelicadoA, Figueiredo E and Silva L 2016Community perceptions of renewable energies in Portugal: impacts on environment, landscape
and local development Energy Research and Social Science 13 84–93
Direção-Geral de Energia e Geologia 2019Renovaveis. Estatisticas rapidas no 175maio de 2019 [WWWDocument]URLhttp://dgeg.gov.
pt/default.aspx?cn=808587788780AAAAAAAAAAAA (accessed 7.8.19)
EdenhoferO and Stern LN2009Towards a global green recovery—recommendations for immediate G20 actionURLhttp://lse.ac.uk/
GranthamInstitute/publication/towards-a-global-green-recovery-recommendations-for-immediate-g20-action/ (accessed 7.8.19)
EichenbaumM,Rebelo S andDeResendeC 2016The Portuguese Crisis and the IMF, IEOBackground paper
Energias de Portugal 2013 Portuguese government proposes energy sector extraordinary contribution for 2014 [WWWDocument]Press
ReleaseURLhttps://edp.pt/en/Investidores/informacaoprivilegiada/2013/Pages/
GovernoPortuguespropoecontribuicooextsectorenergetico2014.aspx (accessed 3.7.17)
EUBusiness 2016 Portugal bows to EUpressure to lower budget deﬁcit [WWWDocument]EUBusinessURLhttp://eubusiness.com/
news-eu/portugal-budget.167s (accessed 3.7.17)
EuropeanCommission 2018Portugal. Integrated national energy and climate plan 2021-2030 https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/ﬁles/
documents/ec_courtesy_translation_pt_necp.pdf
EuropeanCommission 2017 Second report on the state of the energy unionURLhttps://ec.europa.eu/commission/second-report-state-
energy-union_en (accessed 7.8.19)
EuropeanCommission 2016aEx post evaluation of the economic adjustment programme (https://doi.org/10.2765/755597)
EuropeanCommission 2016b Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of theCouncil on the promotion of the use of energy
from renewable sources
EuropeanCommission 2016cNREAPs and progress reports DATAPORTAL [WWWDocument]URLhttp://iet.jrc.ec.europa.eu/remea/
nreaps-and-progress-reports-data-portal
EuropeanCommission 2015a Stability and growth pact [WWWDocument]URLhttp://ec.europa.eu/economy_ﬁnance/economic_
governance/sgp/index_en.htm (accessed 6.6.17)
EuropeanCommission 2015b Eurobarometer Special report: climate change 2015Physiological Research 64 897–905
EuropeanCommission 2014European economy. The economic adjustment programme for Portugal, 2011–2014. (https://doi.org/10.2765/
85246)
EuropeanCommission 2013European commission guidance for the design of renewables support schemes
EuropeanCommission 2010Europe 2020—Europe’s growth strategy (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2010.03.010)
EuropeanUnion 2015Keep on track. Portugal, EU tracking roadmap 2015
Eurostat 2017 Eurostat [WWWDocument]URLhttp://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/de (accessed 9.20.17)
Everett T, Ishawaran L, Ansaloni GP andRubinA 2010 Economic growth and the environmentDefra Evidence and Analysis 1–50 Series
paper 2
FoxonT J 2013Responding to theﬁnancial crisis: Need for a new economics Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 6 126–8
Gouveia J P, Dias L,Martins I and Seixas J 2014 Effects of renewables penetration on the security of Portuguese electricity supplyAppl. Energy
123 438–47
Grimaccia E andRondinella T 2015Howausterity put a brake on the energy transformation in Italy ed BGalgoczi (European TradeUnion
Institute (ETUI))Europe’s energy transition in the austerity trap [WWWDocument]URLhttps://etui.org/content/download/
21142/176499/ﬁle/15+Europe+energy+transformation+Web+version.pdf
Hall P A andTaylor R 1996 Political science and the three new institutionalisms Political Studies XLIV 936–57
HermanK 2013TheGreen Job Engine in Portugal
IEA 2016 Energy policies of IEA countries Portugal 2016.URLhttps://webstore.iea.org/energy-policies-of-iea-countries-portugal-2016-
review (accessed 7.8.19)
IEA 2015 Energy statistics ofOECDcountries 2015 (https://doi.org/10.1787/energy_stats_oecd-2015-en)
IEAWind 2013 2013 annual report. 31 PortugalURLhttp://repositorio.lneg.pt/bitstream/10400.9/2734/1/IEA-Wind-2013-Portugal.
pdf (accessed 7.8.19)
International EnergyAgency 2017 Portugal. Renewable energy policies andmeasures database [WWWDocument]. IEA/IRENA Joint
Policies andMeasures database. URL http://iea.org/policiesandmeasures/renewableenergy/?country=Portugal (accessed 3.7.17)
Kingdon JW1984Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Boston/Toronto: Longman)
LeichenkoRM,O’BrienKL and SoleckiWD2010Climate change and the global ﬁnancial crisis: a case of double exposureAnnals of the
Association of AmericanGeographers 100 963–72
LindenA J, Kalantzis F,Maincent E and Pienkowski J 2014 Electricity tariff deﬁcit: temporary or permanent problem in the EU?European
Commission Economic Papers 534, 1–68
LockwoodM,KuzemkoC,Mitchell C andHoggett R 2017Historical institutionalism and the politics of sustainable energy transitions: a
research agendaEnvironment and Planning C: Politics and Space 35 312–33
López B E 2015Energy TransformationUnder the Pressure of Austerity: the Case of Spain ed BGalgoczi (Brussels: EuropeanTradeUnion
Institute (ETUI))Europe’s energy transition in the austerity trap [WWWDocument]. URL https://etui.org/content/download/
21142/176499/ﬁle/15+Europe+energy+transformation+Web+version.pdf
Peña I, Azevedo I L andMarcelino Ferreira LA F 2017 Lessons fromwind policy in Portugal Energy Policy 103 193–202
Pereira J P, Pesquita V, Rodrigues PMMandRuaA 2018Market integration and the persistence of electricity pricesEmpirical Economics
2018 1–20
Pereira J P andRodrigues PMM2015The impact of wind generation on themean and volatility of electricity prices in Portugal IEEE 2015-
Augus 1–5
Pereira P andWemans L 2012 Portugal and theGlobal FinancialCrisis—short-sighted politics, deteriorating public ﬁnances and the bailout
imperative Lisbon School of Economics andManagementWorking Papers 1–30
Peters BG, Pierre J andKingDS 2005The politics of path dependency: political conﬂict in historical institutionalismThe Journal of Politics
67 1275–300
Pierson P 2000a Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politicsTheAmerican Political Science Review 94 251–67
Pierson P 2000bThe limits of design: explaining institutional origins and changeGovernance: An International Journal of Policy and
Administration 13 475–99
Príncipe C 2013 Frommobilisation to resistance: Portugal’s struggle against austerity International Socialism Journal. 138 http://isj.org.uk/
from-mobilisation-to-resistance-portugals-struggle-against-austerity/ (accessed 7.8.19)
ReadR 2009Towards a green philosophy ofmoneyAdvances in Ecopolitics 3 3–26
Reinhart CMandRogoff K S 2009The aftermath ofﬁnancial crisesNBERWorking paper Series
10
Environ. Res. Commun. 1 (2019) 091005
Skovgaard J 2014 EU climate policy after the crisisEnvironmental Politics 23 1–17
Slominski P 2016 Energy and climate policy: does the competitiveness narrative prevail in times of crisis? Journal of European Integration 38
343–57
Stefanini S 2016 Portugal’s clean-power problem [WWWDocument]. Politico. URLhttp://politico.eu/article/portugal-looks-to-free-its-
stranded-renewables-wind-solar-energy-subsidies-european-union/ (accessed 3.7.17)
Stefes CH2010 BypassingGermany’s Reformstau: the remarkable rise of renewable energyGerman Politics 19 148–63
Tienhaara K 2010A tale of two crises:What the global ﬁnancial crisismeans for the global environmental crisis Environmental Policy and
Governance 20 197–208
UNEP2009Rethinking the Economic Recovery: aGlobal GreenNewDeal. URL http://wedocs.unep.org/handle/20.500.11822/7727
(accessed 7.8.19)
VonHagen J and StrauchRR 2001 Fiscal consolidations: quality, economic conditions, and successPublic Choice 109 327–46
World Bank 2017WorldData Bank [WWWDocument]. URL http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx (accessed 6.6.17)
11
Environ. Res. Commun. 1 (2019) 091005
